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News Media and the Survival of Preference Diversity 
 
Abstract 
There is a natural tension between the effects on public opinion of social networks 
and the news media. It is widely believed that social networks tend to harmonize opinions 
within them, but the presence of media may accentuate diversity by inserting discordant 
messages. On the other hand, in a totalitarian state where the government controls the 
media, social networks may mitigate the homogenizing pressure of a regime’s 
propaganda. The tendency of opinion to follow the “official line” may be mitigated 
because opponents of the government interact on a personal level and bolster one 
another’s views.  
This paper employs agent-based modeling—an approach that allows researchers 
to observe preference change the individual, social network, and the society levels—to 
explore conditions under which social networks and news media influence citizens’ 
preferences. Citizen agents are embedded within networks of interpersonal 
communication and can be by influenced by widely disseminated news media. Situations 
such as the one where there are no news media, one with polarized news media, and one 
where there is only a monolithic (state controlled) media that broadcasts a single, 
consistent message. We also explore the role of selective perception in these conditions. 
The results indicate that the overall impact of news media is contingent on the variety of 
preferences news media provide as well as on the willingness of agents to accept media 
messages at face value.  
Keywords: communication networks, preference, diversity, media, selective perception, 
agent-based modeling 
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Introduction 
Many students of political communication have contended that communication 
networks tend to homogenize preferences of their members. The longstanding view had 
been that social networks are almost completely homogeneous, rendering interpersonal 
communication a somewhat hollow exercise in re-affirmation of shared opinions  
(Axelrod, 1997; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1968). That extreme view has been 
somewhat muted by recent work, but there is still a general tendency to believe that 
opinion networks collect together like-minded people and encourage conformity (Mutz & 
Martin, 2001). Some recent empirical research indicates that there are higher-than-
expected levels of preference diversity among people who regularly interact (Baker, 
Ames, & Renno, 2006; Feldman & Price, 2008; Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2002; 
Zuckerman, Kotler-Berkowitz, & Swaine, 1998), causing a re-formulation of our theories 
about the role of social networks in opinion formation. 
There is an emerging consensus for the view that individual opinions reflect a 
complicated mixture of influences, including interpersonal interactions over a period of 
time and ideas and messages gathered from the news media. Whereas individual 
interactions are, by definition, confined to the small spaces of social networks, the 
distinguishing characteristic of news media is that a single message may be consumed by 
many people simultaneously. One might suppose that news media will tend to wield an 
enormous impact on opinion, but there are several personal and social network attributes 
that may mitigate media impact . The primary personal elements that mitigate media 
impact include the tendency of some to ignore the news media altogether, the ability to 
discount media messages that contradict long-term personal experience, and the ability to 
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sort through media and particular messages to find components that support existing 
opinions. Equally important, however, there are the mitigating elements in social 
networks. Media messages may have “shock value” that impacts public opinion over the 
short term, but social interaction can often remind people of their long standing opinions 
and bolster people who are “on the verge” of changing their minds (Huckfeldt, et al., 
2002; Huckfeldt, Johnson, & Sprague, 2004). 
The complexity of this process, involving variables at the individual, group, and 
social levels, makes the assessment of media impact a difficult task for empirical research. 
One may predict that a democracy where the news media are polarized and all citizens 
sometime perform selective perception—interpreting received messages in a way that 
make their values or stances consistent with those that held in mind—will grow more 
polarized and that preference diversity that an individual could perceive within his or her 
community will decrease. This validity of scenario may be sound but it is very difficult to 
examine with an empirical approach (Shibanai, Yasuno, & Ishiguro, 2001). Is the 
existence of the polarized news media environment detrimental to the cultivation of a 
heterogeneous environment where individuals perceive a great level of preference 
diversity to make fair choices about an issue or a candidate? And, to what extent does 
selective perception performed by the audience influences this process? To understand 
the effect of polarized media sources on a controversial issue, one needs to contract a 
system with multiple news sources against a system of no news media and a system 
where there is only one news source. Agent-based modeling (ABM) renders a way to 
answer (a) how interacting with the news media and communication networks and (b) 
how performing selective perception affect preference diversity. 
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The Interplay of Communication Networks and the News Media 
The view that social networks are homogeneous and self-reinforcing traces back 
to the early research on public opinion that is known as the Columbia School (Berelson, 
Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lazarsfeld, et al., 1968). The 
view that people are inclined to talk to like-minded others and vote for a candidate that is 
supported by the majority of the group members has inspired much follow-up research in 
the United States (Beck, 1991; Mutz, 2001; Scherer & Cho, 2003) and Great Britain 
(Pattie & Johnston, 2001). Perhaps the original contention that social networks are 
homogeneous was an over-exaggeration, but there is nonetheless a considerable amount 
of truth and an increasing number of evidence showing that networks tend to exert a 
homogenizing influence. 
The empirical research suggests that the homogenizing influence of social 
networks often stops short of eliminating preference diversity. Instead, there are several 
factors that sustain preference diversity within networks. People who are in the minority 
in one social context are often able to find people of similar perspective in other contexts. 
Interaction with self-selected network members, especially when new information is 
obtained from trustworthy others, may cause opinion change, but it can also bolster 
existing opinions (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine, 1995; Lake & Huckfeldt, 1998). 
Social networks tend to be highly idiosyncratic and non-overlapping. It is not typically 
the case that people who talk to each other form a closed circle that excludes all others. 
Rather, it is more likely the case that each individual person constructs a list of 
discussants, and the lists held by several people who interact do not coincide to a large 
degree. In other words, even if two people interact with each other, it is not likely that 
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they share the same discussants. As a result, people who hold views that are unpopular in 
one setting sometimes find support from other members of their personal networks who 
hold similarly unpopular views (Beck, Dalton, Greene, & Huckfeldt, 2002; Huckfeldt, et 
al., 2002). There is also evidence for the view that individuals are not necessarily adverse 
to political disagreement. People seem to seek out others that they consider to be 
experts—those with greater level of political knowledge—even though they do not agree 
with those experts (Carmines & Huckfeldt, 1996; Miller & Krosnick, 2000). 
On the surface, it seems as though the news media might exert a powerful 
homogenizing force on public opinion because a single message is disseminated across 
society, touching individuals across a variety of social networks. Early research which 
sought to quantify the impact of the media left researchers disappointed because the 
impact seemed to be rather “minimal” (Bartels, 1993; Converse, 1964).  
Recent findings point out that the influence of the news media on the public is 
conditional. Psychological mechanisms such as selective exposure, selective perception, 
and selective retention (Klapper, 1960; Mutz, 1998) may be a part of the explanation for 
the minimal effects. People that coincide with their current views (Mutz & Martin, 2001). 
The “uses and gratification theory” emphasizes that individuals use the media to 
strengthen their existing preferences (McLeod, Kosicki, & McLeod, 2002; Rubin, 2002). 
When discordant media messages arise, people use their current beliefs to judge the 
credibility of a media source and often misremember messages that run counter to their 
pre-existing beliefs (Oliver, 2002). Where news sources, such as radio talk shows, take a 
one-sided approach to a controversial issue, the mechanism of selective perception drives 
individuals to be more radical in their preferences (R. Lance Holbert, 2004; Jones, 2002).  
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Built upon these empirical findings, this study attempts to assess the extent to 
which the news media and social networks homogenize the public and the extent to 
which selective processes (particularly selective perception) aggravate (or mitigate) the 
consequence of homogenization of preferences. 
The resurgent debate on the “minimal effects” (see, Robert Lance Holbert, Garrett, 
& Gleason, 2010) should not lead to the conclusion that the news media are unimportant, 
any more than the Columbia School findings indicate that social networks are irrelevant. 
Rather, both sets of findings point to the fact that individual opinions reflect a 
complicated mixture of personal experience, interpersonal communication, and exposure 
to the news media. Theories and empirical findings in this field suggest that the media 
message can bolster an individual’s opinion, and if that individual is in the minority 
within a given family or workplace, then the media play an important role in mitigating 
the homogenizing pressure of interpersonal interaction. The media may not have the 
impact of observably changing an opinion, but it is important nonetheless. The problem is 
that it remains difficult to observe the subtle influence of news media on the dynamics of 
the formation of preference at the individual and the aggregate levels.  
When one tries to study the role of the news media and social network’s influence, 
it is also important to acknowledge the fact that individuals differ in the way they interact 
with information sources, such as the frequency of accessing the news media, 
involvement in political discussion, and the likelihood of performing selective perception. 
A finding that political knowledge facilitates the process of incorporating new policy-
specific information into political judgments (Gilens, 2001), which confirms a classic 
distinction between the politically aware and the politically less aware (Converse, 1964; 
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Fiorina, Abrams, & Pope, 2005), further suggests that there exists a certain proportion of 
individuals that are more capable of processing political news and making sense of the 
pieces of information than the politically unaware majority. Because party identification 
and the media news consumption reinforce each other, the politically aware will be more 
able to resist information from the news media.  
In sum, the literature suggests that preference diversity survives when social 
support is available within one’s communication networks. Unfortunately, empirical 
studies that attempt to distinguish media effects from communication networks is not 
entirely satisfying. As Mutz (1998) contends, the influence of personal interaction on 
opinion is implicit (See also, Shane, 2001). Huckfeldt et. al (2004) also suggest that, 
because network effects are dynamic and subtle, it may be that empirical research will 
not resolve the problem to the satisfaction of all. Moreover, although the literature has 
identify the existence of selective perception, the role of this mechanism in aggravating 
or mitigating social polarization remains unclear. 
In this article, we intend to show that it is possible to use a series of computational 
simulation to make some headway on a theoretical level (Gonzalez-Avella et al., 2006; 
Shibanai, et al., 2001). Taking into account the insights gained from previous empirical 
research, we propose a self-organizing computer program that take into account the 
nature of communication networks and important factors of information processing. 
 
Previous Models of Opinion Dynamics 
Students of public opinion were among the first social scientists to introduce 
agent-based models. Many of the core ideas of simple cellular automata found direct 
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applications to opinion models that represented spatially-arrayed agents colored squares 
in a grid of cells. The social impact model (Latane, 1981; Latane & Nowak, 1997; Latane, 
Nowak, & Liu, 1994; Andrzej Nowak, Szamrej, & Latane, 1990), a leading application of 
the cellular automata, describes a situation in which each agent is simultaneously 
pressured by all of the rest. Agents that are close together exert a stronger influence on 
each other than agents who are far apart, and cells change value when the pressure in 
favor of change exceeds the pressure opposed to it.  
One of the major shortcomings of the social impact model is that it does not 
describe inter-agent communications in any detail. The distance-based formula for social 
pressure is assumed, rather than derived within the framework of the model. The agents 
do not interact on a one-to-one basis. That is certainly not the case in other early opinion 
models, where individual interactions are allowed and they drive the development of the 
system. Building on Carley (1991), Axelrod’s (1997) highly influential “culture model” 
(referred to as the ACM) described agents on a grid who select each other for interactions 
and copy traits from one another. Although it has not always been clear in discussions of 
the ACM, that model always evolves into a social system evolves into rigidly separated 
blocks, where the agents within each block are completely identical and agents from 
neighboring blocks are completely different from each other (Huckfeldt, et al., 2004). In 
many simulations, the end result is a homogeneous society.  
The ACM has been the basic framework in which many variations have been 
considered. The arguments offered, however, should be qualified in light of the fact that 
the ACM tends to homogenize the society, so changes that are introduced have to be 
interpreted in that light. Two projects have introduced mass communication elements in 
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the reconsideration of the ACM. Shibanai et al. (2001) provide agents with a globally 
accessible information source—the news media—that informs them about the state of the 
society. When a plural information mechanism is assumed, global information distributed 
through the news media may maintain local diversity.1 
Also from a physicist’s perspective, Galam (1997) presents a grid-based model to 
represent agents who make “yes” or “no” decisions. Preference diversity may emerge 
when the model introduces individual differences, such as “cultural values, past 
experiences, ethics and beliefs.” The author claims that individuality is “a necessary 
ingredient to both weaken extreme option and oppose an external social pressure” (p.79). 
The introduction of agents that are impervious to social interaction may prevent the 
homogenization of opinion, but we doubt that it is a necessary component. Quite the 
contrary, a richer model of information evaluation seems to both prevent the 
homogenization of opinion and generate a more empirically accurate prediction about 
opinion dynamics. Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague (2004) develop a model in which 
agents accumulate opinions from various agents and then adopt new views when there is 
substantial support for those views in their personal networks. Galam (2005a, 2005b) 
proposes a similar strategy, one in which agents respond to pressure from their neighbors 
only when certain supports for the current point of view are lacking. Galam (Galam, 
2005a) suggests, as do Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague, that the extension of the model 
to include media effects would be quite welcome.  
                                                
1 Using the terminology of statistical physics, Gonzalez-Avella et al. (2006) represent the ACM as an Ising 
spin glass and introduce message sources that are available across several cells. When the individual 
probability of accessing the news media is sufficiently large, the news media will contribute to cultural 
diversity. The media source, hence, acts as a force that thwarts the homogenizing tendencies of social 
networks. The authors note the irony of this finding: the insertion of an effect that is common across cells 
tends to diversify the cells. But one should not forget that the result is specific to the ACM, a model that 
has a very particular dynamic that does not match our expectations in the study of public opinion. 
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Model Design 
Following this stream of research, we employ a richer model of social interaction 
and then introducing mass media components. Our social network model is based on the 
view that persuasive information primarily comes from family and like-minded friends 
with whom people interact, but divergent views may be encountered on a regular basis. 
We construct an agent-based model to simulate the long-term influence of political 
interaction in conjunction with selective perception of media messages.  
Agent-based modeling (ABM) has been increasingly widely used in the social 
sciences (Axelrod, 1997; Johnson, 1999) and studies of opinion formation have been 
widely used (Hegselmann & Krause, 2002; Huckfeldt, et al., 2004). The model we used 
is S-RAS, built upon John Zaller’s RAS model of opinion formation using Swarm 
Simulation libraries ( http://www.swarm.org) (Liu, 2007, 2010). The term agent in this 
study refers to citizens who are evaluating information (for example, they might be 
thought of as voters during an election campaign). The agents follow behavioral rules and 
collect preferences through dyadic interactions. Figure 1 provides a visualized flow chart 
that summarizes how agents in this model update their preferences. This figure includes a 
number of variables and mechanisms to be detailed below. 
Note that the goal of ABM design is not to mirror the real world perfectly, but 
create a reasonably realistic framework that characterizes the essential features of the 
problem that we are studying. This approach represents self-contained information 
processing agents who interact according to a variety of possible behavioral rules. Unlike 
reality, which frustrates our efforts to isolate media and network effects, the simulation 
12 
News Media and the Survival of Preference Diversity 
framework offers an opportunity to use an “artificial society” to measure the impact of 
hypothesized conditions on phenomena of interest (Epstein & Axtell, 1996).  
 
The Features of Agents 
We consider a model in which there is one issue, which might represent the 
choice of candidates in an election (Bush or Kerry in the 2004 American presidential 
election, for example) or a “Yes” or “No” decision on a referendum. We abstract this by 
simply referring to two values, 1 (or “Yes”) and 0 (or “No”). A two valued piece of 
information is called a “bit”. At the outset, each agent has randomly assigned opinion, 
either 0 or 1. This means that, in each simulation, the initial conditions present us with an 
approximately evenly divided society.  
Each agent has a “political memory”, a string of bits that represents the agent’s 
experience. Each element represents an impression, scored either 0 or 1, to summarize 
perceptions about the position of a discussant or the news media. Agents do not keep 
comprehensive records on what particular agents “say,” or which agent contributed a 
particular opinion. They simply formulate Yes or No impressions and add them onto the 
string of bits in memory. This approach has been proposed in several studies (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1981; Zaller, 1992).  
The memory strings of the agents can be used to summarize the state of the 
society. The memory string of an agent who encounters only “No” opinions would look 
like this: (0,0,0,...,0), while that of an agent who encounters only “Yes” would be 
(1,1,1,...,1). If a society is composed of agents like that, then we say it is highly polarized, 
in the sense that the experiences of randomly drawn agents are likely to be either 
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completely different or exactly the same. On the other hand, in a society where agents 
encounter a mixture of opinions, memory strings would have more variety. If we 
calculate the average of these bits, we arrive at a numerical index that can be displayed in 
the model’s graphical interface.  
Every agent is unique and autonomous in its behavior. There are six fixed 
parameters that are set for each agent at the beginning of the simulation: party 
identification, political expertise, capacity of memory, the probability of discussing 
politics, the probability of accessing the news media, and the probability of performing 
selective perception (.1 to .9).  
In S-RAS, the majority of citizens are ordinary agents, while a small proportion of 
them are politically aware, an aspect of design that is consistent with Katz and Lazarsfeld 
(1955). A “politically aware” agent is one that has a longer memory (20 bits are 
remembered), higher expertise (drawn at random from 6, 7, 8, 9, 10), a higher propensity 
to access the news media (equally likely between .6 and .9), and a high propensity to 
discuss politics (between .6 and .9). We set that an artificial society is composed of 2% of 
such politically aware agents, while the majority of agents have shorter memories (10 
bits), lower political expertise (drawn at random from 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), and lower 
probabilities of discussing politics, accessing the media, and exercising selective 
perception (all parameters drawn at random from the interval between .1 and .5). By this 
design, a politically less aware agent is less likely to initiate a political interaction and is 
also less likely to be the target of an interaction initiated by another who is seeking 
political expertise.  
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Agents who perform selective perception will interpret what they receive from the 
news media (either 0 or 1) to be consistent with their belief system. When agents do not 
perform selective perception they will ignore messages from the media, or store nothing 
in memory, when they access the news media at a given iteration. We assume that the 
politically aware, compared to the less politically aware, are more likely to selectively 
perceive and reinterpret messages from the news media consistent to their belief system. 
Therefore, we set that individual citizen agents favoring 1 (or saying “Yes”) are more 
likely to store 1 in memory every time they access the chosen news object; agents 
favoring 0 (or saying “No”) are more likely to receive 0 every time they access the news 
media. If we take one more step to take into account the mechanism of selective 
perception mentioned above, in our model politically aware agents that favor 1 are more 
likely to receive 1 every time they access the news media than are the politically unaware 
that are also favoring 1. Similarly, for agents favoring 0, the politically aware are more 
likely to receive 0 every time it access the news media than are the politically unaware 
that are also favoring 0. For example, a politically aware agent is created with the value 
of its partisanship set to 1 and the value of selective perception initiated .6. When the 
agent accesses its favorite news media (should be the media that favor 1), it will have an 
odd .6 to save 1 in its running tally of memory. Four out of ten times when the agent 
chooses to access the news source it will not perform selective perception, which means 
that it will store neither 0 nor 1 in its running tally. The agents will retain their opinion 
unless a substantial amount of evidence accumulates in favor of the other side’s point of 
view. Recall that this is a central element in the autoregressive influence model 
(Huckfeldt, et al., 2004) and the theory of spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1993).  
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Dyadic Interaction within a Communication Network 
All interaction among agents is dyadic in nature. There are no “group 
discussions.” Rather, agents search for like-minded others with whom to interact. Agents 
look for discussants based on their contact lists where the priority is an agent with a 
higher level of political expertise and the same party identification. When an agent finds 
an available discussant, both agents will become unavailable to the other agents (See, 
Huckfeldt, et al., 1995).  
Regarding the design of communication networks and “contact lists,” the agents 
are evenly distributed on a 3x3 square grid where every agent is surrounded by eight 
possible contacts. Each agent’s political party identification and political expertise is 
clearly visible to its contacts. An agent will decide to initiate a political interaction with a 
given probability, and then the agent will seek out a discussion partner. Agents can only 
initiate discussion with another if that other agent is not already having a discussion with 
someone else. The agent’s search process will proceed in two steps. First, the contacts 
that share the agent’s political party identification are considered. They are sorted by 
political expertise and the available agent with the most expertise is invited to interact. 
Party identification is the first criterion of contact selection, while political expertise 
comes as the second. The most favorable contacts are those with the same political 
identification and of higher political expertise. The less favorable contacts are those with 
different party identification but higher political expertise. The least favorable agents are 
those with different identification and lower political expertise. The particular contacts 
with whom any agent will interact is thus somewhat unpredictable.   
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Social interaction is not necessarily based on geographical distance (as would, for 
example,Adrzej Nowak, Latane, & Lewenstein, 1994). Hence, a reader is suggested to 
view that the eight possible contacts can be located in a diverse set of geographical 
positions but remain connected with an agent. For example, Mary has forms her circle of 
political discussants, composed of her parents living together, her boyfriend that lives in 
another town, two close friends in her “American politics” class, and three other friends 
online. To Mary, this circle of eight contacts is real and they are not necessarily live close 
to her, and anyone of her contact list has his or her own contact list where Mary may or 
may not be listed. 
 
Integration of News Media 
We construct the news media object as an object, external to an agent’s 
communication network, that broadcasts “the sequence of the most preferred features, to 
be referred by the target agents equally,” (Shibanai, et al., 2001, p. 84) such as 
“advertising or propaganda being imposed by controlled media on all elements of a social 
system” (Gonzalez-Avella, et al., 2006, p. 46119). Unlike communication networks 
where an individual interacts with limited number of people, a news media object can be 
seen as any source of information other than dyadic interpersonal discussion. Because by 
design every agent will have an equal opportunity to access self-selected news media 
objects and because the news media object is subjectively chosen, an agent will receive 
preferences that are consistent with the agent’s belief system. Similar to what Shibanai et 
al. (2001) describe in their first experiment, news media objects we described above can 
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be seen as the 9th network member (in addition to the 8 self-selected discussants in a 
Moore neighborhood) of an agent and the top of the agent’s contact list.  
Salient issues, especially controversial ones, such as abortion, gay rights, and tax 
cut, usually lead to polarization in the public. The attitudes of the news media regarding 
these issues—supporting or opposing an issue, or holding conservative or liberal tone 
about the issue˜ are usually explicitly and implicitly revealed in their programs, the 
choice of sound bites or events, talk shows, etc (Iyengar & Hahn, 2007). To be consistent 
with this empirical pattern, we construct two news media objects in our model indicating 
two streams of “global information,” each of which can be understood as a TV channel, a 
newspaper, a radio program, a magazine, or a news website on the Internet. These 
characteristics of the news media in our model, therefore, lie in the assumption 
performing selective perception is a matter of degree when individuals access the news 
media.  
 
The Experiment Design 
Given a model of artificial society described above, we use five sets of parameter 
values to explore (1) the extent to which the influence of media use differs from the 
influence of communication networks and (2) the influence of selective perception on 
preserving preference diversity within communication networks.  
Other things being equal, Experiment 1 (No Media) has no news media object 
(the value for the parameter numMedia is set to 0) so that interaction with their 
communication networks is the only way in which agents obtain political information. 
Experiment 2 (Two Media Objects & Agents Performing Selective Perception) has two 
18 
News Media and the Survival of Preference Diversity 
news media objects, one favoring 1 and the other favoring 0 (the value for the parameter 
numMedia is set to 2). and allows all agents to perform selective perception. Experiment 
3 (Two Media Objects & Agents Performing No Selective Perception) keeps the setting 
of Set 2 but turns off the mechanism of selective perception.  
Initial conditions are controlled so that the i’th run of each model is confronted 
with an identical set of initial conditions. As a result, any differences observed across the 
models on the i’th run are solely due to differences in the behavioral rules that are 
employed. Hence, it will be meaningful to make some fine-grained comparisons across 
the simulation results. With these first three experiments, net effect of communication 
networks can be shown through a comparison the results of Experiment 1 and the results 
of Experiments 2 and 3. We will also see the net effect of selective perception mechanism 
by comparing the results of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3.  
Next, in Experiments 4 (One Media Object and Agents Performing Selective 
Perception) and 5 (One Media Object & Agents Performing No Selective Perception) we 
replicate Experiments 2 and 3 except that we reset parameter values of numMedia to 1. 
The monotone news media object consistently favors 0 or “No”.  
We have collected batches of 100 runs for each of the 5 experiments. The 
simulation begins with randomly assigned conditions, such as the location of the two 
classes of agents, and stops when opinion patterns appear to have stabilized (20 passes 
are made through the list of agents without any preference change), or when the number 
of passes exceeds 900.  
The starting points for each run within each batch are equivalent. That is to say, in 
the first run of each experiment, the same set of parameter values, such as information 
19 
News Media and the Survival of Preference Diversity 
about voter preferences, party identification, and expertise is used. Each run for each 
experiment begins with approximately half (recall preferences are assigned randomly) of 
the 16,000 agents (including the two classes of the agents—the politically aware that 
account for 2% of the population and the less politically aware that account for the rest 
98%) holding preference “1” and the other half holding “0.” The aggregate indicators are:  
1. The proportion of agents who hold vote preference 1 or “Yes.” This indicator will 
suggest if the distribution of political preference will change over time.  
2. The level of perceived diversity—a summary of the homogeneity of the agent 
environments. Agent experiences diversity if it has 2 or more opposing opinions 
in its memory at a given time. The aggregate indicator represents the proportion 
of agents who experience diversity. 
Having simulation run forever does not help understanding the dynamics of a short-
term campaign period. Moreover, although 900 is an arbitrary number used to stop 
simulation, we found that the patterns of simulation exceeding 900 are not much different 
from those found at this time step. 
 
Simulation Results 
The series of simulation lead to two major findings. First, an artificial society in 
which agents access no news media or a monotone medium will form identifiable 
preference clusters. Second, the effect of selective perception is contingent upon the 
media environment. In the artificial society in the present study where the news sources 
are polarized we find that selective perception helps preserve preference diversity at the 
communication network level (Experiment 1). In an artificial society where agents access 
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only one news source, however, selective perception demolishes such diversity 
(Experiment 4).  
First, the small standard deviations across the board suggest that every experiment 
has small variance across their 100 runs. Each run of the model (i.e. from the time step 0 
to the time step 900) is initiated with a different random seed, so the time-trajectories of 
the artificial societies are unique. Nevertheless, the small standard deviations indicate that 
the patterns emerging from simulations will be insensitive to random variation in initial 
conditions.  
Second, consider the maintenance of diversity over time. The initial conditions 
have approximately 50 percent of agents holding the preference 1 or “Yes” and the rest 
favoring 0 or “No.” It is interesting to find that the proportion of agents supporting “Yes” 
is quite similar in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 5. As a clear contrast to the first three 
experiments, this proportion drops in Experiment 4 (.007). This finding suggests that, if 
the public is polarized between “Yes” and “No,” the status of polarization is very likely 
to continue unless there is change in the news media environment, such as all news media 
take the same side of the issue (in the case of this paper, the media turn to support “No”).  
The row of “Perceived Diversity” in Table 1 reports the means of the proportion 
of agents perceiving preference diversity. The initial proportion of agents perceiving 
preference diversity is .5. Table 1 shows dramatic drop in Diversity across the five 
experiments: .214, .232, .335, .009, and .232, respectively.  
The decline in Diversity suggests the formation of homogeneous networks. When 
the simulations end, agents reporting that they perceive preference diversity are those 
who reside in the “edge” of homogeneous networks. This proportion for Experiment 4 
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is .009, suggesting that there are only about 14 agents (out of 1,600) perceiving diversity. 
The small amount of diversity survives is found in the form of opinion clusters. By 
design, only homogeneous networks of members of the minority prevent their members 
from being conformed to the majority preference.  
A closer comparison across the five experiments suggests the following. First, the 
almost identical pattern of Experiment 2 and Experiment 3 suggests that, given two news 
media sources, the politically aware, by design, account for only 2% of the population 
have little leverage to change the pattern and that selective perception has a weak 
relationship with the proportion of agents perceiving diversity.  
A further comparison between Experiment 4 and Experiment 5 suggests a distinct 
role of selective perception in the condition of monotone media source. As Experiment 4 
shows, the single source of news media broadcasting 0 or “No” successfully reshapes and 
homogenizes the public's preference (the proportion of agents supporting “Yes” dropped 
to 0.7 percent). If agents, particularly the politically aware, stop performing selective 
perception but start to ignore messages from the news source, the proportion of agents 
perceiving diversity will increases to the level of Experiments 1, 2, and 3. 
 
Visualized Patterns 
The pictures shown in Figure 2 confirm those derived from Table 1 and provide 
more information about the influence of the number of media sources and the influence 
of selective perception on the distribution of disagreement.  
The initial condition (the upper left of Figure 2), based on the assumption that 
individuals have a preexisting preference guided by their party identification, randomly 
22 
News Media and the Survival of Preference Diversity 
distributed agents holding a preference. About half of the agents hold 1 or “Yes” (white) 
and the rest hold 0 or “No” (black). By design, the cells do not simply show voter 
preference in white and black but show opinion that varies between 0 and 1. Hence, 
Figure 2 better than a figure simply showing agent's voter preference to presents the 
distribution of ambivalent agents (in gray). Because individual agents will start to collect 
impressions from either the news media or their network members and update their 
opinions based on the average of the past preferences, gray cells will emerge when a 
simulation starts. Gray cells will indicate the locations of agents experiencing diversity or 
ambivalence. These are representative snapshots. Presented pictures are obtained from 
the particular runs in which the values being tracked, Opinion YES and Diversity, are 
closest to the means of those two variables across the 100 runs (as shown in Table 1). 
Specifically, for the 100 simulations of each experiment, Figure 2 presents the 85th run 
(seed 3850763) for Experiment 1, the 21st run (seed 908381) for Experiment 2, the 46th  
run (seed 2232645) for Experiment 3, the 55th run (seed 2566711) for Experiment 4, and 
the 75th run (seed 3396126) for Experiment 5. These run numbers and specific seeds 
recorded here will help future researchers to use our model to replicate the presented 
results.  
The visualized pattern of Experiment 1 shows that interaction with network 
members at the local level creates opinion clusters. There is relatively little diversity 
found within the clusters, which suggest that these clusters homogenize the preferences 
of their members.  
The pictures of Experiments 2 and 3 in the middle column of Figure 2 show the 
net effect of selective perception. One sees that Experiment 2 has greater variance in 
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opinion within communication networks and that Experiment 3 shows clear edges of 
opinion clusters (even though the variance of opinion is greater in Experiment 3 than in 
Experiment 1. This suggests that, although polarized news sources sustain the 
polarization of voter preferences, agents in Experiment 2 perceive greater diversity in 
their communication networks than their counterparts in Experiment 3, even though the 
averages of the number of agents perceiving diversity in both experiments (as shown in 
Table 1) are similar. This pattern implies that in a society with multiple news sources the 
mechanism of selective perception at the individual level is likely to contribute to the 
survival of preference diversity at the network level. If the individuals in this society turn 
to ignore political information about the given issue every time when they access the 
news media, the number of individuals perceiving diversity will increases (as the means 
in Table 1 suggest), but opinion clusters will grow more homogeneous.  
The mechanism of selective perception has a different role when the news media 
environment is changed. When all news sources broadcasting the same preference, or 
when there is only one news source, it will be difficult to see a balance between the two 
vote preferences. Public opinion will be drawn toward the side that the news medium 
favors. As Experiment 4 shows, the opinion raster becomes dark society-wide quickly 
and this pattern remains stable (the pattern converges within 580 time steps, including 20 
consecutive time steps when no agent change its preference). The 50 percent of agents 
favoring 1 or “Yes” in the beginning of the simulation apparently cannot persist against 
influence of their discussants who consistently get “brain-washed” through selectively 
reinterpreting or trusting what the medium suggests (0 or “No”) on the given issue. This 
pattern further implies that the selective perception mechanism conducted by the 
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audience can be an invisible helper for a regime to reshape public opinion in a short time. 
Preference diversity or political disagreement in this homogeneous environment may 
survive, but this will occur only if dissidents can meet and continue to interact with each 
other.  
This pattern of homogeneity can be changed in three possible situations. First, the 
news medium itself starts to provide diverse perspectives on the given issue. Second, the 
regime or the society opens the market to other news sources. These two situations will 
transform the pattern of Experiment 4 to one that similar to the pattern of Experiment 2. 
The third situation is that the audience of that society changes the way they 
process the single news source. Given that everything is controlled, when individuals 
start to ignore what they receive from the news source on the controversial issue (due to 
either cynicism or distrust to the government), preference diversity survives and clusters 
of the opposite preference emerge. The pattern of Experiment 5 can grow to one that is 
similar to the patter of Experiment 3. 
In sum, the series of simulation demonstrates that, first, the existence of monotone 
medium matters in homogenizing a society when individuals consciously or 
unconsciously selectively process the messages from the news source; the homogenizing 
effect of communication network accelerate this process. Second, in a fragmented and 
polarized news media environment, that some agents performing selective perception 
does not help increase the level of perceived diversity; the proportion of agents 
perceiving diversity within their communication networks will increase when agents are 
less selective, if not completely ignorant about the news messages. 
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Conclusion and Discussion 
In the present study, we have shown how diverse news sources and the 
mechanism of selective perception affect the survival of preference diversity. The results 
indicate that the overall impact of the introduction of the news media is contingent on the 
diversity of the messages offered by the media as well as the willingness of agents to 
accept media messages at face value.  
By design, political discussion within communication networks is a force to 
homogenize individuals’ preferences. This pattern corresponds to the three robust 
features of social self-organization: clustering, consolidation, and continuous diversity 
(Latane & Nowak, 1997; Latane, et al., 1994). Moreover, the comparison across the 
simulation results suggests that—given the availability of multiple news sources and an 
assumption that individuals consistently access their favorite news s and sometime 
perform selective perception of the news—preference diversity can survive in networks 
composed of like-minded individuals. These findings are consistent with the view that 
accessing the news media is a force of enhancing social heterogeneity (Gonzalez-Avella, 
et al., 2006; Mutz & Martin, 2001; Shibanai, et al., 2001).  
The findings of this paper advances what we have known by two points. First, 
increasing probability of interacting with the news media may not necessarily lead to 
preference diversity. We suggest that accessing the news media sustains preference 
diversity is contingent upon whether individuals have freedom to access self-selected 
news sources. Regarding the survival of preference diversity, there exists a discernible 
difference between a society with multiple news sources and a society only having state-
own news media (or a society with multiple news sources but all favoring one side of an 
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issue). Second, selective perception of news media messages as a mechanism of 
processing information plays a critical role in the survival of preference diversity. 
Correspondent to an empirical finding that selectively accessing fragmented media 
environment increases the likelihood that viewers strengthen their partisanship and 
ideology (Jones, 2002), our finding further shows that, in a multiple-source news 
environment the number of individuals who perceive preference diversity is likely to drop 
if the assumption of selective perception holds. In a situation where all of the individuals 
ignore what they receive from the news media or simply refuse to take these piece of 
information seriously the number of individuals perceiving preference diversity is likely 
to increase and the boundaries of opinion clusters is likely to become distinctive. This 
implies that when individuals in a society become more selective in the source of news, 
or even prone to reinterpret messages to support their existing (biased) beliefs, the society 
might grow more polarized (as shown in the comparison between Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3 in Figure 2. This finding also implies that, if a society has grown polarized, 
one way to mitigate it is to decrease opportunities that drive individuals to “bowling 
along” (Putnam, 1995) and be selective about news information, such as providing public 
forums for citizens to obtain broader perspectives about candidates or an issue (e.g., 
Fishkin, 1995).  
In a society of monotone news source, the story is different. Selective perception 
is likely to facilitate the homogenization of preference at the aggregate level. Indeed, the 
homogenization of the public’s preference should not be simply attributed to this 
selective perception mechanism; instead, we see it as a result of the synthesis of the three 
forces—selective perception of the information 0 that makes half of the audience 
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favoring 0 grow resistant to the influence from their network members favoring 1, the 
homogenizing effects from self-selected like-minded network members that makes those 
favoring 0 less likely to change, and the autoregressive influence of the communication 
networks that make individuals favoring 1 conform to the majority (contrast Experiment 
4 against Experiment 5 in Table 1).   
Researchers concerning democratization across the world may associate this 
pattern of Experiment 4 to non-democratic regimes where news sources are controlled by 
the government or a political party. This pattern can also be associated to a democracy 
where the news media stand together to broadcast a certain preference. We predict that a 
pattern of Experiment 4 (see Figure 2) can be transformed to a situation like the pattern of 
Experiment 2, when alternative news source becomes available, or to the pattern like 
Experiment 3, when citizens, particularly those favoring 0, turn to ignore the source, or 
even distrust or reject the biased source of political education. For example, the pattern of 
Experiment 4 may be similar to the homogeneous communist society in Poland before 
1989. Poland is one of new democracies whose democratization was triggered by media 
liberalization. The emergence of a diverse media free of direct political interference is 
both a cause and a characteristic of the democratization process (Millard, 1998). From 
our perspective, the growing diversity in citizens’ preference about whether or not 
adopting democracy underlies such democratic transition. Latent disagreement about the 
government can grow dramatically when individuals become less willing to trust the 
global news source.  
Indeed, ABM is more like a “thought experiment” (Axelrod, 1997) than an 
approach to predict the future. This does not say, however, that results derived from 
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ABM should not be bridged to empirical approaches. Instead, this paper welcomes 
inspection of the implications with case studies and empirical examinations about the 
suggested relationships. For example, the visualized patterns of Experiments 2 and 3 in 
Figure 2 suggest that individuals residing within a boundary of an opinion cluster in 
Experiment 3 are more likely to perceive a greater level of homogeneity or agreement 
than those in Experiment 2. Efforts to validate heuristics drawn from such social 
simulations will help the construction of external validity of the model.  
Future research applying ABM in general or our model in particular, to the study 
of political communication needs to address the following three issues. First, there is 
much room to fine-tune our model to study public opinion. In the present project, we 
assume a low and fixed proportion of elites (i.e. the politically aware agents). Although a 
study about the influence of varying the number of elites is beyond the scope of this 
paper, we look forward seeing more applications of ABM (e.g., Bowden & McDonald, 
2006) to the study of the influence of the increase or decrease of such elite agents on the 
dynamics of opinion formation. Moreover, as the picture provided by Experiment 2 
resembles most modern democratic regimes that preserve highest level of preference 
diversity, we suggest future studies tune the role of news media and communication 
networks and see how such changes in context affect the characteristics of opinion 
formation.  
Second, technically one should consider add complexity to the model. Agents of 
the model in this paper are diversified by 6x2 dimensions (six variables—memory 
capacity and propensity to discuss politics, to access the media, and to perform selective 
perception—and two classes—the politically aware and the politically unaware). Future 
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studies extending this project may consider adding variance to the following elements or 
parameter values of the model to answer specified questions: the diversity of the 
propensity to conform to the majority , the scope of media influence (Gonzalez-Avella, et 
al., 2006), the size of networks, the strength of news media influence, the number of 
issues considered, the strength of the news media, the mechanism of selective perception 
on messages from network members (Galam, 2005b), the difference between political 
experts and general voters regarding various degrees of selective perception (see also, 
Fiorina, et al., 2005), and a new class of agents representing “independent voters”. 
Adding complexity to the model may not change the fundamental patterns found with a 
concise model; doing so increases the internal validity of the original model design. If a 
newly introduced parameter or an alternative assumption is found to change a pattern 
found in the literature, however, the new parameter or the new assumption will in turn 
contribute to model design and theory development  (e.g., Huckfeldt, et al., 2004).  
Finally, cross-disciplinary study about information processing, social cognition 
and political communication are expected to advance the development and application of 
the present research. Researchers will need to catch up with the development of selective 
perception theory and empirical findings about voting behavior, such as if (and how) 
accessing the media is correlated with discussing politics and how individuals conform to 
or resist against the influence of the majority. Our conclusions are derived directly from 
our model design, which is based on a number of assumptions that worth examination in 
cross-disciplinary studies, such as  
• Individuals’ communication networks are composed of a limited number of self-
selected members;  
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• Individuals tend to seek like-minded political experts as major political 
discussants;  
• Individuals selectively choose their political information sources;  
• Individuals have limited and fixed capacity to store information;  
• The level of individuals’ political knowledge or expertise remain stable over time; 
• While discussing politics, individuals differentiate the implicit message held by 
their discussants, make simplistic judgments about the other’s positions, and add 
that impression to its existing evaluation of an issue (a receive-accept-sample 
process);  
• The politically aware individuals are more efficient and selective than their 
politically less aware counterparts in the process of seeking and processing 
political information;  
• The politically aware individuals account for a small portion of the public;  
• The choice of news media reflects an individual’s partisan orientation. 
Whenever these assumptions are modified or advanced, we will need to update 
corresponding the model design and check if previous patterns still hold. This task leaves 
a great level of uncertainty to ABM modelers, but we think is where physics, 
communication scholars, social psychologists, computer scientists, and political scientists 
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Table 1  
Summary Statistics of the 100 Runs of Simulation for Each Experiment 
Parameters Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4 Exp. 5 
Number of News Source 0 2 2 1 1 
Agents Performing Selective 
Perception 
- Yes No Yes No 










Preference “Yes” .507 .501 .501 .007 .501 
 (.051) (.052) (.036) (.004) (.055) 
Preference Diversity .214 .232 .229 .009 .232 
 (.015) (.014) (.012) (.005) (.013) 
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Figure Captions 
 
Figure 1. The Flow Chart of Agent Information Processing 
Figure 2.  Patterns of Preference Diversity  
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Figure 1. The Flow Chart of Agent Information Processing 
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News Media and the Survival of Preference Diversity 
Source: Liu, F. C. S. (2010). Polarized news media and the polarization of the 
electorate. International Journal of Artificial Life Research, 1(1), p. 39. 
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Figure 2.  Patterns of Preference Diversity  

















Note: The snapshots were taken at the 900th time step (update).  
 
 
